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Abstract
Welfare measures under threats of environmental catastrophes are
studied using the "parable" apparatus of Weitzman and LÄ ofgren [22].
The occurrence probability of the catastrophic events is driven (at
least partly) by anthropogenic activities such as natural resource ex-
ploitation. Without external e®ects, the green NNP is a genuine wel-
fare measure vis-µ a-vis a particular parable economy. Often, however,
the occurrence hazard constitutes a public bad, treated as an external-
ity by agents who ignore their own contribution to its accumulation.
In such cases the green NNP, although accounting for the event hazard
rate per se, fails to properly internalize future e®ects on the hazard
rate of current economic activities and as a result overestimates wel-
fare. The bias term associated with the green NNP is derived and
expressed in a simple and interpretable form.
Keywords: green NNP; environmental catastrophes; hazard rate; uncer-
tainty
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In a widely cited paper, Weitzman [17] has shown how to relate national ac-
counting to a welfare measure at any given time. The method has since been
extended and applied in a wide range of environmental related issues, includ-
ing sustainability [18, 4, 5], technical change and economic growth [3, 18, 22],
intergenerational equity [9], and pollution abatement policies [12]. The re-
cent books of Weitzman [21] and Aronsson et al. [1] provide detailed accounts
on this line of research. In this note we apply the green accounting method-
ology to situations involving threats of environmental catastrophes which
are (at least partly) induced by anthropogenic activities. Examples of such
catastrophic events include nuclear accidents [8, 2], global warming related
calamities [15, 10], pollution-related events [7, 16], and biodiversity loss and
species extinction [14, 11]. All these events are classi¯ed as "catastrophic"
because their abrupt occurrence in°icts a signi¯cant damage, which should
not be ignored in the national accounts. Moreover, the conditions that trig-
ger the events are not completely understood or controlled, and the exact
occurrence time cannot be predicted in advance. The nature of the events
and the scale of the damage in°icted often render complete insurance schemes
infeasible.
The presence of environmental threats has undesirable welfare implica-
tions and a question arises regarding whether these implications are captured
by measures such as the green NNP. The answer depends on whether the
market prices that underlie the NNP properly account for the environmental
hazard, which in turn depends on whether the hazard involves external ef-
fects. Without external e®ects, the event risk is fully re°ected by the market
prices and the green NNP can be related to a stationary-equivalent welfare
measure by means of the "parable" apparatus of Weitzman and LÄ ofgren [22].
We show that the green NNP represents the stationary consumption rate of
a "nonchalant" parable economy that, up to the occurrence date, consumes
all of its income regardless of the event threat.
Environmental hazards, however, are often fraught with externalities, as
individual agents tend to treat the hazard as a public bad. Indeed, the
1green accounting methodology is very explicit in requiring that accounting
is "comprehensive", implying that no e®ect is left out, including external
hazard e®ects (see [3, 18, 22] and references they cite for studies of green
accounting with external e®ects in an economic growth context). When
agents ignore their own contribution to hazard accumulation and the stocks
of the mitigating environmental resources decrease over time, the green NNP
overestimates welfare. This is so because the market prices of the hazard-
mitigating assets, while re°ecting the current hazard per se, fail to properly
account for future changes in its rate due to current exploitation activities.
To focus attention on environmental hazards, we consider in Section 2 a
simple economy with a single composite consumption good and two capital
goods, of which one is the environmental capital a®ecting the probability of
the event occurrence. (Extensions to more general settings, such as in [19,
20, 6], will not change the nature of the results.) In Section 3, a stationary-
equivalent welfare measure under event uncertainty is de¯ned and compared
to the green NNP. The two cases { when the event hazard is internalized and
when it is treated by agents as an externality { are considered and contrasted.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The economy
Except for the modi¯cations needed to account for the environmental events,
we follow the formulation of Weitzman [17, 18] and Weitzman and LÄ ofgren
[22]. We consider an economy with a single composite consumption good,
denoted C, and several capital assets, of which we single out a natural re-
source capital stock Q. The other capital stocks, denoted K, represent the
traditional stocks used for production as well as other environmental assets.
For the present purpose no generality is lost by considering a two-dimensional
capital vector (K;Q). The constant (consumption) discount rate is denoted
r.
The special role of the environmental stock Q is manifest via its e®ect
on the hazard rate h(Q) of abrupt occurrence of some detrimental event
such that h(Q)dt measures the conditional probability that the event will
2occur during [t;t + dt] given that it has not occurred by time t when the
resource stock is Q. Let T represent the random event-occurrence time with
the probability distribution and density functions F(t) and f(t), respectively.
For a given Q(t) process, the hazard h(Q(t)) is related to the distribution
F(t) according to h(Q(t)) = f(t)=(1 ¡ F(t)) = ¡d[ln(1 ¡ F(t))]=dt, yielding
F(t) = 1 ¡ e







Let IK and IQ represent the net investment rates in K and Q, respectively,
_ K(t) = IK(t) and _ Q(t) = IQ(t): (2.3)
Given the capital stocks (K;Q), consumption-investment decisions are con-
strained to the convex production possibilities set S(K;Q), i.e., the combi-
nation (C;IK;IQ) is feasible if
(C;IK;IQ) 2 S(K;Q): (2.4)
Let '(K;Q) denote the post-event value function, representing the max-
imal present value of all future consumption streams from the occurrence
time T onward discounted to time T, given that K = K(T) and Q = Q(T).
At time t prior to occurrence, a feasible consumption-investment policy
fC(¿); IK(¿); IQ(¿); ¿ ¸ tg gives rise to the expected present value (dis-






















R(¿;t) = r(¿ ¡ t) + [­(¿) ¡ ­(t)] =
Z ¿
t
[r + h(Q(s))]ds (2.5)
and ET denotes expectation with respect to the distribution of T. The max-
imal present value of all feasible consumption streams at time t is, therefore,
given by







subject to (2.3) and (2.4), given K = K(t) and Q = Q(t). Notice that
V (K;Q) depends on t only through the initial capital stocks K(t) and Q(t)
(changing t and keeping the initial stocks ¯xed is equivalent to a mere shift
of the origin of the time index). It is assumed that (2.6) admits a unique
solution.
The damage function is de¯ned as
Ã(K;Q) = V (K;Q) ¡ '(K;Q); (2.7)
such that the expected loss associated with occurrence during [t;t + dt] is
Ã(K(t);Q(t))h(Q(t))dt. For example, a "doomsday" event that ceases all
further economic activities entails '(K;Q) = 0 and Ã(K;Q) = V (K;Q).
Recurrent events may destroy some appreciable amounts DK and DQ of the
existing capital stocks, in which case '(K;Q) = V (K¡DK;Q¡DQ), or a®ect
the production feasibility set S, changing the possibilities (and welfare) for
post-event performance. Regardless of the exact speci¯cation, we assume
that the damage function is known and su±ciently large to rule out the
possibility of complete insurance coverage. When the extent of damage is
also subject to uncertainty, we take Ã to represent its expected value.
Let PK and PQ be the current-value costate variables of K and Q, and
de¯ne the functions
Y (K;Q;PK;PQ) = max
(C; IK; IQ)2S(K;Q)
fC + PKIK + PQIQg (2.8)
and
G(K;Q;PK;PQ) = Y (K;Q;PK;PQ) ¡ h(Q)Ã(K;Q): (2.9)
































Q(¿) = ¡@G=@Q; (2.12)
where the dot indicates derivative with respect to ¿ and the derivatives on the
right-hand side of (2.11) and (2.12) are evaluated at the optimal arguments.




K ¡ [r + h(Q
¤)]P
¤
K = ¡[@Y=@K + h(Q
¤)@'=@K]; (2.11¤)
while condition (2.12) assumes di®erent forms depending on whether the
e®ect of Q on the hazard h(Q) is internalized. If the hazard is treated
by agents as an externality, the dependence of h on Q is ignored and h is
taken as an exogenous function of time evolving along the equilibrium path





Q ¡ [r + h
¤(¿)]P
¤
Q = ¡[@Y=@Q + h
¤(¿)@'=@Q]; (2.12¤)
where we use the property @V=@Q = P ¤
Q. However, when agents account
for the change in hazard due to their own resource exploitation, the e®ect of
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To verify that (2.10), (2.11¤) and (2.12¤) are necessary conditions for a
solution of (2.6) when h(¿) = h(Q(¿)) and ­(¿) are treated as exogenous
functions of time, notice that, with the e®ective discount rate r + h(¿), the
current-value Hamiltonian is C + h(¿)' + PKIK + PQIQ and the conditions
follow from the Maximum Principle.
5When the e®ect of Q on h is internalized, we treat ­ as a third state
variable satisfying d­=d¿ = h(Q) (c.f. (2.2)) with the initial value ­(t), and
de¯ne the present-value (discounted to time t) Hamiltonian
H = [C + h(Q)'(K;Q)]e
¡R(¿; t) + ¸KIK + ¸QIq + ¹h(Q); (2.13)
where ¸K; ¸Q and ¹ are the present-value costates of K; Q and ­, respec-
tively. Noting (2.5), d¹=ds = ¡@H=@­ = [C(s)+h(Q(s))'(K(s);Q(s))]e¡R(s; t).
Integrating from ¿ to 1 along the optimal path and using the transversality
condition lims!1 ¹(s) = 0, gives ¹¤(¿) = ¡V (K¤(¿));Q¤(¿))e¡R¤(¿; t). With
the current-value costates PK(¿) = ¸K(¿)eR¤(¿; t) and PQ(¿) = ¸Q(¿)eR¤(¿; t),
conditions (2.10), (2.11¤) and (2.12¤¤) follow from the Maximum Principle.
It is instructive to consider the equivalent formulations (2.11) and (2.11¤)
(or (2.12) and (2.12¤)-(2.12¤¤)) under two extreme speci¯cations of the dam-
age function. For "doomsday" events ' vanishes and (2.11¤) shows the main
e®ect of the hazard in increasing the e®ective rate of discount. When the
damage is vanishingly small, G reduces to Y (c.f. (2.9)) and (2.11)-(2.12)
reduce to the conditions corresponding to an event-free economy.
In fact, equations (2.11) and (2.12) describe the evolution of the com-
petitive market prices in an economy operating under the occurrence hazard
h(Q). To see this, suppose that at time t prior to occurrence, the economy
owns the capital stocks (K;Q). With these stocks, the consumption equiva-
lent of Y (K;Q;PK(t);PQ(t))± can be produced during an in¯nitesimal time
interval [t;t+±]. With probability 1¡h(Q)± the event will not occur during
the interval, leaving the value V (K;Q)e¡r±. With probability h(Q)± the
event occurs, leaving the value '(K;Q)e¡r±. The expected value at time
t + ± (discounted to time t) is thus
Y (K;Q;PK(t);PQ(t))± + V (K;Q)e
¡r± ¡ h(Q)±e
¡r±Ã(K;Q):
Alternatively, PQ(t)" units of consumption can be traded for " units of the
environmental stock, producing Y (K;Q + ";PK(t);PQ(t))± during the same
short interval, and possessing a stock worth V (K;Q+")]e¡r± with probability
1¡h(Q+")± that the event will not occur during [t;t+±], or '(K;Q+")e¡r±
6with probability h(Q+")± of occurrence. The discounted expected value in
this case is
¡PQ(t)" + Y (K;Q + ";PK(t);PQ(t))± + V (K;Q + ")e
¡r±
¡ h(Q + ")±e
¡r±Ã(K;Q + "):
In equilibrium agents are indi®erent between these two options. At time










With e¡r± = 1 ¡ r± + o(±), we obtain, after neglecting terms of order o("±)
and dividing by "±, _ PQ ¡ rPQ = ¡@G=@Q, as stated in (2.12). Condition
(2.11) can be veri¯ed in the same way.
Having veri¯ed that P ¤
K and P ¤
Q are the competitive prices, we identify
Y ¤(t) ´ Y (K¤(t);Q¤(t);P ¤
K(t);P ¤
Q(t)) of (2.10) with the green NNP. We turn
now to investigate the relation between the green NNP and a stationary-
equivalent welfare index for the economy.
3 Welfare measurement
To de¯ne a stationary-equivalent welfare measure corresponding to the value
V (K(t);Q(t)), consider a "parable model" µ a la Weitzman and LÄ ofgren [22]
of an (hypothetical) economy possessing at time t (prior to occurrence) the
capital stocks (K(t);Q(t)) which allow to produce the net output Y P and
is under the risk of event occurrence at some future random time T. From
time t to occurrence, all net output is consumed and the capital stocks are
kept ¯xed at (K(t);Q(t)). Thus, the output and hazard rate also remain
¯xed at Y P and h = h(Q(t)), respectively. Upon occurrence, the value
' = '(K(t);Q(t)) is obtained. The expected present value of the nonchalant


















7(the adjective "nonchalant" is attached to the parable policy to re°ect the
property that all output is consumed regardless of the hovering event threat).
The parable consumption rate CP = Y P constitutes a welfare index for
the parable economy because it describes the stationary rate of consump-
tion that can be supported prior to occurrence. To establish a link with
the real economy, we look for the parable output Y P that gives rise to
V P(K(t);Q(t)) = V (K(t);Q(t)) of (2.6), denote it by W(t) and interpret
this quantity as the stationary-equivalent welfare measure appropriate for
the real economy. Observing (3.1) and (2.7), the welfare index we seek is
W(t) = [r + h(Q(t)]V (K(t);Q(t)) ¡ h(Q(t))'(K(t);Q(t))
= rV (K(t);Q(t)) + h(Q(t))Ã(K(t);Q(t)); (3.2)
which exceeds the standard index rV by the expected immediate damage at
time t.
It turns out that when the e®ect of Q on the hazard rate h is internalized,
the NNP equals the welfare measure de¯ned by (3.2). However, when the
hazard is treated by agents as an externality, the NNP introduces a bias, as
established by the following Proposition:




and the NNP agrees with the welfare measure (3:2) evaluated at (K¤(t);Q¤(t)).
(b) When the hazard is treated by agents as an externality, i.e., when h(¿) =















8Proof: (a) When the e®ect of Q on h is accounted for, the property dH=d¿ =







Integrating from t to 1 along the optimal path and using the transversality
condition lim¿!1 H(¿;t) = 0 (see [13]), gives
H(t;t) = rV (K
¤(t);Q
¤(t)): (3.6)
Recalling that P ¤
K(¿) = ¸¤
K(¿)eR¤(¿; t), P ¤
Q(¿) = ¸¤
Q(¿)eR¤(¿; t) and ¹¤(¿) =







Comparing with (3.6) and (3.2) veri¯es (3.3).
(b) When h(¿) and ­(¿) are taken as exogenous functions of time, the
present-value Hamiltonian is
H(¿;t) = [C + h(¿)'(K;Q)]e
¡R(¿;t) + ¸KIk + ¸QIQ (3.7)
and the property dH=d¿ = @H=@¿ gives











Integrating from t to 1 along the optimal path and using the transversality
condition lim¿!1 H(¿;t) = 0 implies






















9Taking the derivative of (3.9) with respect to t gives _ Z¤(t)¡[r+h¤(t)]Z¤(t) =




K(¿)eR¤(¿; t), P ¤
Q(¿) = ¸¤
Q(¿)eR¤(¿; t) and the Hamil-






Comparing (3.8) and (3.10), noting (3.2), veri¯es (3.4). ¤
Part (a) provides a precise meaning to the welfare signi¯cance of the
NNP without externalities in terms of the nonchalant parable. The bias
term Z¤ introduced in part (b) stems from the failure of the market prices
to fully account for the e®ect of Q on the hazard rate. The bias vanishes
for non-in°uential events (i.e., ' = V and Ã = 0) or when h is independent
of Q (see (3.5)). Often the environmental stock mitigates the hazard (i.e.,
h0(Q) < 0), in which case resource extraction above replenishment increases
the occurrence threat over time and gives rise to Z¤(t) < 0 . The presence
of the externality enhances the tendency to overexploit the environmental
resource. Although the shrinking stock Q is included in the green NNP, the
ensuing increase in the hazard rate is not properly represented by its price
and the NNP provides an over-optimistic measure of welfare.
4 Concluding comments
The notion that current market prices contain all the information relevant
to determine long-term welfare is appealing, but its validity is subject to the
assumption of comprehensibility. The green accounting literature has long
recognized that this assumption is an idealization because of the pervasive-
ness of market failures. Here we ¯nd that, without externalities, the green
NNP can still be interpreted as a welfare measure also in the presence of
event uncertainty. This can be done because markets respond properly to
the environmental threats by adjusting the time preferences from the "bare"
discount rate r to the e®ective rate r+h and modifying the prices associated
with the relevant capital stocks.
10Often, however, agents treat the event hazard as an externality, hence
the comprehensibility requirement is violated and the green NNP tends to
overestimate welfare. If the hazard-a®ecting environmental asset is at or
near a steady state, the hazard rate is approximately constant over time and
the NNP bias disappears. Otherwise, neglecting to account for their own
contribution to increasing the hazard, agents overexploit the environmental
resource, reducing the (expected) welfare for the whole economy. Standard
regulation techniques, such as a Pigouvian tax on the exploitation of the
hazard-mitigating resource based on its marginal hazard e®ect, can induce
agents to internalize the e®ect and increase welfare to the value indicated by
the green NNP.
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